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Employment effects of CAP payments in the UK non-farm economy 
 
This paper investigates the effects of the CAP payments on the indirectly generated non-farm 
jobs in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which are central to job creation. It 
examines whether there are differences in the effect according to business location - rural or 
urban, the agricultural supply chain, and according to CAP Pillars. A microeconomic 
approach is employed, based on firm data from FAME dataset combined with detailed 
subsidies information from DEFRA. The generalised method of moments (system GMM) is 
used to estimate the effect of CAP payments in both static and dynamic models of 
employment. The results suggest positive net spillovers of CAP payments to non-farm 
employment. Although the magnitude of the effect is small, it is economically significant. In 
general, Pillar 1 has a stronger positive employment effect relative to Pillar 2. However, 
Pillar 2 payments have a stronger positive effect per Euro spent in rural areas and within 
agricultural supply chain. 
 
1 Introduction 
This paper investigates the contribution, if any, of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) payments to non-farm sector employment in both rural and urban areas in the UK 
through its direct and indirect effects on agriculture’s up- and downstream industries, and the 
economic diversification of rural areas. In recent years, given the difficult recovery from the 
2008 economic and financial crisis, the provision of employment is of primary interest to 
policy makers and to millions of UK citizens. Additionally, whatever the UK package for 
Brexit will be, it is almost certain that the UK will leave the CAP and the ways agriculture is 
supported will change. Naturally, majority of existing studies are concerned with the effects 
of the forthcoming changes on agriculture but it is also useful to have some indications of the 
wider possible benefits or losses beyond farming by investigating the inter-industry spillovers 
of the CAP payments on non-farm employment.  
For decades, the CAP payments implicitly maintained the level of agricultural 
employment, or at least slowed down its decline under the pressures of technical and 
structural change. In the face of these forces, the CAP could hardly have further substantial 
impact in the direction of job creation or even job maintenance in primary agriculture, 
although the need to increase the CAP contribution to employment has been emphasised on 
many occasions by the European Commission and European Parliament, and was included as 
one of the three objectives of rural development support for 2014-2020 (art 4, Regulation 
(EU) No 1305/2013). However, in reality the CAP contributions to employment may have 
been more important than they appear at first glance due to possible inter-industry spillovers 
on non-farm employment which are often not-accounted for.  
3 
 
Against this backdrop, the objective of this paper is to estimate the effect of the CAP 
payments on the indirectly generated non-farm jobs. In particular, the study focuses on three 
key questions: (i) whether CAP payments are positively associated with non-farm 
employment; (ii) whether there are differences in the effect according to business location - 
rural or urban, and within agricultural supply chain, and (iii) whether different CAP payments 
have different employment effects, i.e. Pillar 1 direct payments and Pillar 2 rural 
development payments.  
Most previous CAP and employment research has focused on the CAP’s impact on 
agricultural and rural jobs, often in an EU regionalised framework (for example, Petrick and 
Zier, 2011; 2012; Olper et al., 2014). Several studies have investigated the economy-wide 
effects either through Input-Output (I-O) analysis (Mattas et al., 2005; 2011) or regionalised 
social accounting matrices (Psatopoulos et al., 2004). Mattas et al. (2011) investigated the 
effect of rural development payments under Pillar 2 in five EU regions. The study revealed 
that the employment generating effects differed across sectors and depended on the economic 
structure of the regions. The evaluation of the effect of €507.8 million rural development 
funding in the period 2007-2013 on the two Greek case study regions (Anatoliki Makedonia 
and Thraki) revealed the creation of 11,741 jobs or 5.3% of the baseline employment, with 
the strongest employment effect observed in the secondary sector. A recent report for the 
European Parliament Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (COMAGRI) 
concerning the role of CAP in creation of rural jobs has reviewed 53 studies. Concerning the 
direct effect of the CAP, 16 studies reported a negative effect on employment in agriculture; 
9 studies – a positive one; 8 studies - a mixed effect, depending on farm structure and rural 
economy, and 6 studies - no effect. However, all of these studies were agri-centred - they 
were either focused on agriculture and rural jobs, or on labour migration out of agriculture 
(EP, 2016). One notable exception is the recent paper by Blomquist and Nordin (2017), who 
employed a regional macroeconomic approach and estimated the open-economy relative 
multiplier of agricultural subsidy reform in Sweden, thus capturing the CAP’s impact on 
regional employment beyond agriculture. They estimated the costs per job as equal to USD 
26,000. An earlier paper by Petrick and Zier (2012) using a different methodology (a 
dynamic labour adjustment model) applied to East Germany estimated higher costs - €50,000 
per job. 
The present paper attempts to fill the gap in the literature and to stimulate a broader 
debate about the wider, rural-urban and inter-industry employment effects of the CAP. The 
4 
 
paper employs a micro approach, based on firm data extracted from the Financial Analysis 
Made Easy (FAME) dataset of Bureau van Dijk combined with detailed subsidies data 
extracted from Department of Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) CAP 
Payments database. The effect on employment in small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) is the focus of analysis. SMEs are defined by the UK government and the EU as 
businesses with less than 250 employees. The rationale to focus on SMEs is based on two 
considerations. First, at the beginning of 2013, SMEs represented over 99 per cent of all 
private-sector businesses in the UK, accounting for 59.3 per cent of private-sector 
employment and for 48.1 per cent of private-sector turnover (Department for Business 
Innovation and Skills, 2013). They are also central to job creation as recognised by the UK 
government. Second, as mentioned above, one of the objectives of the study is to investigate 
whether there are different effects of CAP payments on employment in rural and urban non-
farm businesses. Rural businesses are mainly SMEs, and comparisons with large companies 
(national and international) located in metropolitan areas would not make much sense.  
The theoretical underpinning of the analysis is based on Smolny’s (1998) 
monopolistic competition model with delays in adjustment in output price, employment, and 
capacity. The generalised method of moments (system GMM) is used to estimate the effect of 
the CAP payments in both static and dynamic models of employment. The results suggest 
positive net spillovers of CAP payments, although the magnitude of coefficients is rather 
small. Looking at different CAP Pillars, relative to Pillar 2, Pillar 1 direct payments have a 
stronger statistically significant effect on the level of employment in both static and dynamic 
models. However, when the cross-effects with rural location and agricultural supply chain are 
investigated, the effect of Pillar 2 payments is stronger per Euro spent.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents a short 
overview of the CAP subsidies in the UK and their distribution by constituent country. 
Section 3 details the theoretical framework, and section 4 presents the data and the estimation 
strategy. Section 5 presents the results, while section 6 concludes with a brief discussion of 
policy implications. 
 
2 The evolution of CAP subsidies and the implications for employment 
The period covered in the empirical analysis ranges from 2008, the year of the CAP Health 
Check by the European Commission, to 2014 - the first transitional year of the ‘new’ CAP for 
the period 2014-2020. The presentation of the implementation of different CAP measures in 
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the UK is limited to the period analysed, since a wider general discussion of the CAP is 
beyond the scope of the present paper. 
The Health Check of 2008 introduced the main policy changes before implementation 
of the most recent CAP reform for the period 2014-2020 (Allen et al., 2014). It did not 
change the fundamental decisions taken in the 2003 CAP reform, i.e. the introduction of a 
decoupled (from production) Single Farm Payment (SFP) to farmers, conditional on 
environmental and other cross-compliance requirements, and keeping the land in Good 
Agricultural and Environmental Conditions (GAEC), as the main feature of Pillar 1. The 
Health Check moved slightly further in the direction mapped by the 2003 CAP reform, i.e. it 
decreased the remaining coupled payments, increased modulation of funds from Pillar 1 to 
Pillar 2, and removed arable land set-aside. It also provided the EU Member States (MSs) 
with flexible possibilities to assist sub-sectors of agriculture with special problems, the so-
called Article 68 measures. 
From theoretical viewpoint, given existing legislation, the CAP payments can affect 
non-farm employment both through a production and a consumption effect. In the 2003 
Council Regulations establishing the rules for direct support schemes, the SFP scheme was 
treated as income support (OJ, 21/10/2003). The SFP is paid to farmers, the latter defined as 
natural or legal persons, or groups of such persons. Although in theory decoupled, the SFP 
may be invested in farm production and thus increase or maintain the employment in 
agriculture and up- and downstream industries. Bhaskar and Beghin (2007) reviewed a 
number of studies on the coupling mechanisms of decoupled payments. Some of these 
mechanisms include wealth and insurance effects that might increase the use of inputs and 
affect the increase in output. There can also be an effect on investment decisions as farmers 
could save and invest more, as well as increased liquidity of credit-constrained households. 
The decoupled income support to farmers can also have a complex impact on the 
income-leisure trade-off and labour allocation decisions to work on- or off-farm. Further, it 
might increase savings and/or the contemporaneous consumption of farm households of non-
farm goods and services as SFP adds to the overall household purchasing power. For 
example, studies on the impact of agricultural support policy on the household consumption 
in the US show that the marginal consumption varies by income sources - farm income, off-
farm income and government transfers (Carriker et al., 1993; Whitaker, 2009). Whitaker’s 
results indicate that decoupled payments are consumed by agricultural households at a high 
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marginal rate of 24%. The measure of consumption excludes expenditure related to farm 
production, thus it only encompasses non-farm products and services. 
The effect in terms of farmers’ household income/expenditure is generated mainly in 
rural areas but it may or may not correlate with increased employment in those areas, taking 
into account purchases at a distance and services provided from urban areas. Additionally, the 
increase of the overall purchasing power in rural areas depends on how much of the CAP 
payments remain with the farm households. Higher land rent, which is a well-known 
consequence of direct payments, leaks out to landowners who may not live in the locality. 1 
To conclude, there are two main channels through which CAP SFP may affect non-
agricultural employment – through its effect on consumption as a really decoupled payment, 
and through its coupled effect on farm investments and output levels. Both these channels 
would lead to expansion in the demand that the non-farm sector firms face.  
Concerning Rural Development (RD) measures in Pillar 2, there are a wide range of 
channels through which payments can affect non-farm employment. Rizov (2004; 2005) 
studied the effect of CAP on the organisation and performance of rural communities since the 
introduction of Pillar 2 in 1999. He developed a theoretical model of private provision of 
public goods where RD payments lead to diversification of the economic activities in rural 
areas which, in turn, enhances the sustainability of the local economy. While his focus is 
mainly on formally defining the conditions under which the CAP income transfers can 
improve, or otherwise, rural community development, he does not explicitly address the 
complementary employment effects. However, the RD measures may create employment 
both within the local rural community and beyond, in the urban areas, thus emphasising the 
general interdependency of rural and urban areas. The first order effects, similarly to Pillar 1, 
are due to the fact that there is a flow of funds into some rural households which increases 
their purchasing power. Additionally, e.g. RD measures for investments in physical assets - 
farm modernisation, infrastructure, energy-saving technologies - may influence employment 
in research and development, construction, technical services, etc. Business start-up aid for 
young farmers and for non-farm enterprises, as well as village renewal support, can have a 
direct effect on employment in rural and surrounding urban areas. Support to enhance 
                                                          
1 A consequence of the appropriation of a high share of payments by the landowners means that the local 
multiplier effect of CAP Pillar 1 payments is likely to appear lower in those areas where there is a high 
proportion of rented land, as higher rents leak out to landowners who do not always live in the same locality; 
thus, the true effect is likely to be larger. Furthermore, while the presence of leakages is an important 
consideration, which generally applies to farmers’ purchasing power and expenditure, our analytical framework 
is built on the idea of economy-wide spillovers and our data capture the economy-wide effects. 
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biodiversity and the provision of higher-value ecosystem services may help to create non-
farm jobs in rural tourism and associated services. Policy developments within the food 
system, e.g. short food chains, organic box trade, and traceability, can produce employment 
growth along the entire agri-food supply chain.  
However, the form and the level of CAP payments vary across the UK. Table 1 
presents some indicators that exemplify the striking differences in agricultural sectors across 
its four constituent countries.  
- Table 1 here – 
Less Favoured Areas (LFA) payments in England are less important than in the other three 
countries where 70 per cent and more of the agricultural area is designated as LFA. Around 
half of the land area in England is under crops, whilst in the other countries it is either 
predominantly grass land (Northern Ireland and Wales) or rough grazing (Scotland). These 
production patterns, together with farm size and productivity effects, has led to a different 
reliance on subsidies: the lowest in England at 52 per cent of the total income from farming, 
and highest in Wales at 142 per cent (Allen et al., 2014).2 
Table 2 presents in more detail the CAP payments by Pillar in the UK and the 
constituent countries since 2010 – the first year available which falls within the period of 
analysis in this paper. The UK constituent countries took different implementation decisions 
on the decoupled direct payment (SFP) - Scotland and Wales introduced the SFP on a 
historical basis, England opted for a dynamic hybrid version, and Northern Ireland for a static 
hybrid one.  
- Table 2 here – 
 
3 Theoretical framework: a firm employment function 
As mentioned, the aim of this paper is to empirically evaluate the CAP payments impact on 
employment in the non-farm economy. Therefore, the focus here is not on developing a fully-
fledged theoretical model of all possible channels of impact but rather it is on outlining a 
theoretical framework to motivate an appropriate estimating specification and to aid the 
interpretation of results. The theoretical framework employed is based on Smolny’s (1998) 
monopolistic competition model with delays in adjustment in output price, employment, and 
                                                          
2 Total income from farming is the return on own labour, capital and management input of all those with an 
entrepreneurial involvement in farming, generally farmers and partners. It is measured at sectoral level and 
represents the net value added at factor cost minus the compensation of employees, rent and interest. 
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capacity.3 The framework, compared to a perfect competition model, leads to a richer and 
more realistic firm employment (demand) function. The timing assumptions in the original 
model are as follows. In the short run, only output is endogenous. Employment and prices 
adjust in the medium run, with a delay with respect to demand and cost changes, thus under 
uncertainty about demand. Capacities and the production technology are predetermined for 
the price and employment adjustment process, and react only in the long run.  
The assumption about delays in the reduction of employment can be justified by legal 
and contractual periods of notice; there often are also substantial severance costs. In addition, 
reputational losses for firms in the case of frequent dismissals tend to restrict the downward 
adjustment of the labour force to normal separations, i.e. resignations and retirements. Delays 
in the upward adjustment of the labour force involve search, screening and training time. A 
delayed adjustment of prices corresponds to the assumption of price tags and menu cost. 
Importantly, even a short delay between the decision to change employment, and/or the price, 
and the realisation of a demand shock can introduce considerable uncertainty in adjustment 
for the firm.  
The dynamic decision problem of the firm can be reduced to a sequence of static 
decision models which are then solved stepwise. We start by specifying a log-linear demand 
function for the firm’s product (lnD) that allows us to distinguish between the effects of price 
elasticity of demand, demand shifts, and demand uncertainty: 
 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 = 𝜂𝜂𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝜂𝜂 + 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 + 𝜀𝜀,      𝐸𝐸(𝜀𝜀) = 0,    𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝜀𝜀) = 𝜎𝜎2.    (1) 
 
In equation (1), firm demand D is negatively associated with price p, with constant elasticity 
η, Z is a vector of exogenous or predetermined demand characteristics, such as aggregate 
industry demand 𝑙𝑙� and demand shifters induced by market factors or policies, and the error 
term ε (with zero expected mean) captures the realised value of the demand shock which is 
not known at the time of the price and employment decision. The time and firm indexes are 
omitted for notational convenience. 
                                                          
3 Smolny’s (1998) model is related to the family of so called putty-clay models which have a long history in the 
growth and business cycle literature with micro foundations (Johansen 1959; Solow 1962; Phelps 1963; 
Sheshinski 1967; Cass and Stiglitz 1969; Bresnahan and Ramey 1994; Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Power 1999; 
Gilchrist and Williams, 2000).  
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In this paper the information content of the Z-vector in the firm demand function is 
extended with the CAP expenditure indicators.4 Following the discussion in the previous 
section and findings in the limited literature on the impact of CAP subsidies on regional 
development (Vatn, 2002; Peterson et al., 2002; Rizov, 2004; 2005), we argue that the inter-
sectoral spillovers and the local economy diversification effects of subsidies are associated 
with the expansion of aggregate demand that non-farm sector firms face.5 This first-order, 
demand effect is likely to impact significantly on non-farm sector firm employment.6   
According to equation (1), another effect of CAP subsidies on non-farm firm demand 
and employment could occur through the volatility of demand captured by the variance of 
demand σ2; the subsidies would generally reduce volatility of demand, and thus smooth 
employment adjustments. Following this argument, while subsidies would not affect the 
mean of ε they may affect σ. 
To complete the framework, we specify firm supply (S) function determined by a 
short-run production function with capital K and labour L as inputs: 
 
𝑆𝑆 = min(𝑌𝑌𝐾𝐾,𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿) = min(𝜋𝜋𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾,𝜋𝜋𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿),       (2) 
 
where YK is capacity, YL is the employment constraint, and πK, πL are the productivities of 
capital and labour respectively. In the short run, output Y is determined as the minimum of 
supply and demand: 
 
𝑌𝑌 = min(𝑆𝑆,𝑙𝑙).         (3) 
 
The medium-run optimisation problem is 
 
                                                          
4 The extension of the demand equation (1) with CAP expenditure information partially addresses omitted 
variables concerns when specifying an estimating equation. To further deal with omitted variables concerns at 
the estimation stage we also use sets of location, industry, and time dummies. A similar approach to modelling 
the CAP impact on employment in a regional level framework is applied in a recent study by Blomquist and 
Nordin (2017). 
5 The diversification of the local economy driven by CAP payments can be seen as a sustainable development 
effect, associated with a higher average demand level, considering that a diversified local economy would be 
more resilient to economic shocks (Barkley, 1995; Stavins et al., 2003).  
6 There could also be a second-order, supply effect derived through different channels such as changes in 
competition and agglomeration in the upstream and/or downstream industries, but our focus here is on the first-
order (dominant) demand effect. The second-order, supply effect is controlled for in the estimation stage by firm 
characteristics such as size, age, and cost-per-employee, which is also a measure of productivity (e.g., Barrios et 
al., 2011). 
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max
𝑝𝑝,𝐿𝐿    𝜂𝜂𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌) − 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 − 𝑐𝑐𝐾𝐾,        (4) 
 
subject to equations (1) and (2), where E is the expectation operator. Wage w and user cost of 
capital c are treated as exogenous at the firm level.  
There are two relevant optimisation scenarios where capacity is, or is not, binding on 
decisions.7 In the case of capacity constraint, employment is determined from the capacity. 
No more workers will be hired than can be employed with the predetermined capital stock. 
Supply and employment result from:  
 
𝑆𝑆 = 𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿 = 𝑌𝑌𝐾𝐾,       𝐿𝐿(𝑌𝑌𝐾𝐾) = 𝑌𝑌𝐾𝐾𝜋𝜋𝐿𝐿 .        (5) 
 
The optimal price depends on capacity, expected demand shifts, demand uncertainty and 
competition. In the capacity-constrained scenario, the adjustment of employment is inhibited, 
and the whole adjustment with respect to expected demand shifts falls on the price. The 
implication is that level of employment will remain unchanged. 
In the case of unconstrained capacity, which is the most likely case in the UK market 
economy, optimal employment and price are jointly determined by setting marginal costs of 
employment, i.e. the wage rate w, equal to the marginal revenue. The latter is determined as 
the price, multiplied by the productivity of labour, and multiplied by the probability that the 
additional output can be sold, i.e. that demand exceeds supply:  
 
𝜂𝜂(𝑤𝑤)𝜂𝜂𝑉𝑉𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿 < 𝑙𝑙)𝜋𝜋𝐿𝐿 − 𝑤𝑤 = 0.       (6) 
 
The optimal price is determined by unit labour costs 𝑤𝑤/𝜋𝜋𝐿𝐿, and the mark-up is equal to the 
probability of a supply constraint on the goods market. This probability is determined by the 
price elasticity of demand and demand uncertainty, i.e. the optimal price is independent of 
expected demand shifts as set out in equation (1). 
Optimal supply and employment are derived from 
                                                          
7 For completeness, we point out to a third scenario in which labour supply is constrained, i.e., the firm does not 
have sufficient number of applicants. In this case, optimal employment is determined by the (exogenous) labour 
supply which in turn may depend on local market conditions, and regional and national policies including the 
CAP and movement of labour laws. Given the setup of our framework, the labour supply constraint is 
predetermined in short and medium runs. Nevertheless, in our empirical analysis we use locational controls such 
as the rural-urban and supply chain dummies and clustering at constituent country level, as well as sets of time 
and industry dummies which proxy for possible exogenous labour supply constraints.  
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𝑆𝑆 = 𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿(𝑤𝑤) = 𝜂𝜂𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝜂𝜂(𝑤𝑤) + 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 + 𝜀𝜀(̅𝜂𝜂,𝜎𝜎),      (7a) 
𝐿𝐿(𝑤𝑤) = 𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿(𝑤𝑤)
𝜋𝜋𝐿𝐿
,          (7b) 
 
where 𝜀𝜀(̅𝜂𝜂,𝜎𝜎) is the value of the demand shock which distinguishes the supply-constrained 
regime from the demand-constrained regime.8 Demand shifts induced by the expansion of 
demand due to the spillovers and diversification effect of CAP payments lead to growth in 
employment. An immediate adjustment of employment is contained as the limiting case with 
σ→0. Introducing uncertainty reduces the expected utilisation of employment, and has the 
same effect on price and employment as higher variable costs. Thus, uncertainty reduces 
optimal employment and increases the price through the costs of underutilisation of 
employment. However, as argued earlier, if CAP payments reduce uncertainty, then there will 
be less underutilisation of labour and employment would relatively rise.  
Assuming log-normal distribution of ε which follows from equation (1), equation (7b) 
can be written in a log-linear form which together with equation (5) will form the basis of our 
estimating specification discussed in the next section: 
 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿 = −𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝜋𝜋𝐿𝐿 + 𝜂𝜂𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝜂𝜂(𝑤𝑤) + 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 + 𝜀𝜀(̅𝜂𝜂,𝜎𝜎).      (8) 
 
The framework outlined above is useful for the analysis of employment adjustments, 
and price rigidities, during the business cycle in general, and of the implications of the CAP 
payments in particular. For example, suppose that the stochastic process generating demand 
shocks is auto-correlated, i.e. firms expect that demand shocks are persistent. Then, 
unexpected demand shocks affect the utilisation of labour and capital contemporaneously. If 
the actual utilisation differs from the optimum, employment and/or prices adjust as the 
adjustment depends on the availability of capacity. In the case of a capacity constraint (or in 
boom periods), employment would remain unchanged, and the firm would adjust the price. 
With a sufficient capacity (or in recession periods), the firm would adjust employment, and 
the price would remain unchanged.9 CAP payments resulting in sustained higher demand and 
                                                          
8 Note that 𝜀𝜀̅ = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 and its optimal value depends only on η and on the parameters of the probability 
density function (pdf) of 𝜀𝜀.� A pdf of 𝜀𝜀  ̅which is completely characterised by its expected value and variance can 
be written as 𝜀𝜀(̅𝜂𝜂,𝜎𝜎).  
9 The framework yields a further hypothesis about the effects of the price elasticity of demand on employment 
and price adjustment. In the case of demand shocks, a low price elasticity of demand |𝜂𝜂| should favour 
employment adjustments against price adjustments. Hypotheses for the analysis of effects of competition on 
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smoothing the demand fluctuations thus lead to larger firm capacities and more employment; 
in the long run they would also lower the probability of demand shocks hitting the capacity 
(supply) constraint. The above discussion demonstrates that we need to be agnostic of the 
contingencies, in terms of industry and business cycle conditions, that may influence the CAP 
employment effects.10  
 
4 Data and estimation strategy 
In the empirical analysis of firm employment we use the FAME data set of Bureau van Dijk 
combined with detailed subsidies data extracted from the DEFRA CAP Payments database. 
FAME covers all firms filed at Companies House in the UK, and includes information on 
detailed unconsolidated financial statements, employment, location, by post code, and 
activity description. The data used in the analysis contains annual records on over 2 million 
firms over the period 2008–2014. The geographic distribution of the firms in the dataset 
which are available for analysis is presented in Figure 1. The coverage of the data compared 
with the aggregate statistics reported by the UK Office for National Statistics (ONS) is very 
good concerning sales (89 per cent) and employment (90 per cent).  
- Figure 1 – 
While partially available for all years from 2006 to 2014, the CAP subsidy data is not 
complete for some years. This is to a great extent a result of amendments to Commission 
Regulation (EC259/2008). Following a decision of the European Court of Justice, for some 
years after 2008 the Commission removed the requirement to publish subsidy payment data 
on farming individuals and partnerships, though MSs were still obliged to publish data on 
legal entities. In 2013, the Commission introduced new rules for transparency, including both 
individuals and all legal entities. The only exception was for very small beneficiaries who 
receive less than €1,250 in total subsidy (equivalent to £1,045 in 2014 and £972 in 2015); 
their names were withheld and replaced by a code number. Therefore, the workable dataset 
available for this study covers four years: 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2014. The CAP payment 
information comprises the amount of total subsidy and its three components: common market 
organisation (CMO) and direct payments (DP) or aka single farm payment (SFP) made under 
                                                          
employment and price adjustments could also be formulated but they are beyond the purposes of the analysis 
here. 
10 We note that our empirical analysis covers the period of economic downturn following the financial crisis 
from 2007 when firms were generally experiencing decline in demand and thus unconstrained (excess) capacity. 
It would have been interesting to include a period before the great recession but there is no available CAP 
payment data with the necessary detail.  
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CAP’s Pillar 1, and rural development (RD) payments made under Pillar 2. The geographic 
distribution of the average annual CAP payments in the dataset is presented in Figure 2 
- Figure 2 – 
Considering the nature of data available and the theoretical labour demand functions 
(5) and (8) we opt for estimating of the reduced form employment equation (9): 
 
𝐿𝐿∗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝛽𝛽1𝑙𝑙′ +  𝛽𝛽2𝑋𝑋′𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 +  𝛽𝛽3𝑆𝑆′ +  𝛽𝛽4𝐼𝐼′ +  𝛽𝛽5𝑅𝑅′ + 𝛽𝛽6𝑇𝑇′ + ν𝑗𝑗  + 𝜖𝜖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ,   (9) 
 
where the optimal firm j employment L* at time t is specified as a function of a vector of 
demand characteristics D’ (aggregate industry demand and firm demand variance), a vector 
of firm-specific, time-varying characteristics X’ such as productivity (cost per employee), 
size (total assets), and age, as well as the CAP payments S’ (Pillars 1 and 2) at narrowly 
defined location units (postal districts). In the estimating equation, besides the firm fixed 
effects ν and identically and independently distributed error term 𝜖𝜖 also are included vectors 
of industry (including agricultural supply chain) I’, location (by rural-urban and constituent 
country) R’, and time dummy set T’ capturing the heterogeneity in factor prices and price 
elasticity of demand, as well as the business cycle.11, 12 
Equation (9) represents the optimal (desired) level of firm employment and thus the 
estimate of 𝛽𝛽3 can be interpreted as the long run effect of CAP payments on employment.13 
However, as discussed in the previous section firms are likely to experience delays in 
adjusting their employment levels which can take the form of an iteration process leading to 
the formulation of a flexible accelerator or partial adjustment estimating model (Hamermesh, 
                                                          
11 Ericson and Pakes (1995) model the firm profit maximisation problem as a function of firm’s own state 
variables, factor prices, and a vector of the state variables of the other firms active in the market. Olley and 
Pakes (1996) specify a vector of firm specific state variables that consists of the age of the firm, firm’s capital 
stock, and a measure of firm’s efficiency. A market structure consists of a list of these triples for all firms active 
in the market. Thus, considering that our empirical analysis utilises large micro data representative of all 
industry sectors, urban and rural, in the UK, the specification employed is capable of recreating the firm 
interactions in the whole of the UK economy and capturing general equilibrium effects.  
12 Considering that CAP payments go to the farm sector which is located almost exclusively in rural areas due to 
proximity considerations in economic interactions one could expect a stronger CAP effect on rural firms as well 
as on firms that are close to agriculture in other dimensions such as being part of the agricultural supply chain. 
Furthermore, using different levels of geographies at which we aggregate when creating some of the control 
variables, e.g., the aggregate demand, rural-urban dummy and constituent country controls helps address, to 
some extent, the spatial dependency problems; such approach is in the spirit of multi-level modelling applied to 
regional analysis (e.g., Van Oort et al., 2012). Besides, we (partially) account for spatial correlation, in the 
estimated standard errors, by the use of clustering of observations at territorial (constituent country) level. 
13 In the previous section the theoretical framework used described the sequence and frequency of adjustments 
taking place in the firm’s optimisation problem by referring to short, medium, and long run. In this section we 
consider the equilibrium outcome of the optimisation adjustments which equates to the formulation of a long run 
relationship. We note that the long run is simply the entire set of short/medium run optimisation solutions.  
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1993; Bond and Van Reenen, 2007). Such model has been applied in a context similar to ours 
by Petrick and Zier (2012) in their analysis of CAP payment effects on agricultural 
employment. Equation (10) represents a discrete time version of the model: 
 
𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 − 𝐿𝐿 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗−1 = 𝛾𝛾(𝐿𝐿∗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 − 𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗−1),       (10) 
 
where 𝛾𝛾 is the speed of adjustment (0 ≤ 𝛾𝛾 ≤ 1) which is decreasing in the level of 
adjustment costs (Nickell, 1986).  
Solving equation (10) for Ljt and substituting equation (9) for L*jt yields the partial 
adjustment estimating equation for firm employment: 
 
𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝜆𝜆𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗−1 +  𝛽𝛽1𝑙𝑙′ +  𝛽𝛽2𝑋𝑋′𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 +  𝛽𝛽3𝑆𝑆′ +  𝛽𝛽4𝐼𝐼′ +  𝛽𝛽5𝑅𝑅′ +  𝛽𝛽6𝑇𝑇′ + ν𝑗𝑗  + 𝜖𝜖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗. (11) 
 
From equation (11) the speed of adjustment is 𝛾𝛾 = (1 − 𝜆𝜆). In this specification CAP 
payments may affect current labour demand immediately, as measured by 𝛽𝛽3. However, there 
is also a long run effect via the dynamic adjustment process. Considering that in steady state 
𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗−1 the long run effect of CAP payments will be 𝛽𝛽3 𝛾𝛾⁄ . The higher the speed of 
adjustment 𝛾𝛾, the faster is the adjustment of employment to a new equilibrium and the 
smaller the effect of CAP that can be observed in the long run relative to the short run. 
To implement the estimation strategy devised above we manipulate the FAME data in 
several ways. The industry sectors are identified on the basis of the 2007 UK Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) at the 4-digit level. Given the large number of 4-digit 
industries, on several occasions, for definition of specific variables the more aggregated 2-
digit codes were used. All nominal monetary variables were converted into real values by 
deflating with the appropriate ONS industry deflators at 4-digit UK SIC level, when 
available, and at 2-digit level otherwise. The producer price index (PPI) was used to deflate 
sales, wages and CAP payments, and asset price deflators were used for deflating firm 
capital.  
To account for inter-industry linkages, which are important for the transmission of the 
CAP expenditure effects from agriculture to non-agricultural sectors, the input-output (I-O) 
shares of the agriculture, forestry and fishing sector in all other sectors were used averaged 
over the 2005-2010 period. Data was obtained from OECD symmetric I-O tables which 
represent a complete picture of the sectoral interdependencies in the UK economy. 
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Specifically, the Leontief matrix total technical coefficients were used as regression weights 
to account for the sectoral interdependence affecting the transmission of the CAP expenditure 
effects to the non-farm sector firms. It is reasonable to assume that CAP expenditure will 
have stronger effect on firms from sectors closely linked to the farm sector. Therefore, we are 
treating each firm-observation as more or less informative about the underlying relationship 
between agriculture and other industry sectors. Those sectors that are more closely linked to 
agriculture are given more weight, and those that are more remote are given less weight. To 
explicitly estimate the impact of CAP payments along the agricultural supply chain we also 
create an indicator variable equal to 1 if a 4-digit sector is part of the chain and 0 otherwise 
following definitions in van der Vorst et al. (2007). In the agricultural supply chain we have 
included the manufacturing of inputs to agriculture (e.g. fertilisers, pesticides and other 
agrochemical products; machinery for agriculture, forestry and for food processing; renting or 
leasing of agricultural machinery and equipment) and industries downstream encompassing 
food processing and wholesale of agricultural raw materials and live animals. 
As explained earlier, the empirical analysis is based only on data for SMEs, i.e. 
enterprises with less than 250 employees, in FAME. Definition of variables and descriptive 
statistics calculated from the estimated sample of SMEs are reported in Table 3. Average 
SME characteristics are presented by rural and urban locations in Table 4. Generally, there 
are no important differences in summary statistics between rural and urban firms, but rural 
SMEs are slightly larger as measured by employment and smaller in assets, and they face 
smaller local market demand. The cost of employees (and wage) also is lower in rural SMEs. 
In rural areas, more CAP payments are received than in the urban areas as exemplified by the 
total subsidy and the higher share of direct payments. It is noteworthy that our location-based 
(at postal district) CAP payments measure confounds the amount of payments received by 
individual farms with the size of the farm sector at the location considered; nevertheless, such 
measure, of intensity of the CAP payments suffices our analytical purpose. 
- Tables 3 and 4 here – 
For comparison and as a robustness check, we estimate both the static, equation (9) 
and dynamic, equation (11) versions of the labour demand function, derived in the previous 
section using the system GMM (generalised method of moments) estimator (Blundell and 
Bond, 1998). While the system GMM is best suited to deal with dynamic panel data models, 
Roodman (2009, pp. 99, 127), Aguirregabiria (2009), and Alonso-Borrego (2010), amongst 
others, demonstrate its possible applications also to static models with endogenous 
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regressors. The system GMM estimator exploits moment conditions constructed out of 
equation (9) (or equation (11) respectively) and its first-differenced version, and yields 
consistent estimates when the cross-sectional number of observations (N) is large and the 
number of time periods (T) small as in our case (e.g., Hayashi, 2000). The system GMM 
controls for unobserved firm heterogeneity and for potential endogeneity of the firm-level 
explanatory variables (e.g., Baum et al., 2003; Roodman, 2009). For the estimations we use 
Stata’s xtabond2 command. Given the firm-level dependent variable, the firm-level 
explanatory variables are treated as endogenous while the sector-level, regional-level, and the 
time dummy explanatory variables are treated as predetermined or exogenous in alternative 
specifications. 
The explanatory variable of main interest – the CAP payments - which is available at 
postal district level is unlikely to suffer from endogeneity as the location units at which it is 
calculated do not systematically correlate with the spatial patterns of economic activity and 
thus are unlikely to affect the individual firm employment decisions; within each postal 
district there is sufficient independent variation across firms. Furthermore, the decision on 
subsidy allocation is made and known to recipient farms at least one period prior to actual 
disbursement; this is certainly true in the historic allocation model, and to a large degree in 
the hybrid models of subsidy allocation. This timing of information process makes the 
reverse causality of the non-farm firms’ employment decisions on farmers’ behaviour, as a 
mediator of CAP payment effects, very unlikely.14  
 
5 Results 
The estimation results from the SME sample, for the static, and dynamic models, based on 
equations (9) and (11) respectively are presented in Tables 5 and 6.15 As previously 
mentioned, in the estimations, the I-O shares were used to weight each firm-level 
observation, while the observations were also (multiway) clustered at panel identifier and 
constituent-country level to account for fixed effects, and policy environment and structural 
                                                          
14 Petrick and Zier (2012) argue that practically there is no decision power regarding CAP payments at sub-
national, local economic units such as county or local authority and that, in fact, CAP policies are settled at the 
EU and national level ruling out concerns of CAP payment endogeneity in the case of micro data analysis. 
Furthermore, we argue that large parts of the UK, especially England are a rather special case. The rural areas as 
well as the agricultural land are distributed in a tapered manner alongside urban areas and there are no large 
expanses of purely rural or agricultural districts which could directly and significantly influence the regional 
employment situation. 
15 We have run the same set of estimations on the full sample of firms (large and SMEs), and the results 
obtained are qualitatively similar in terms of coefficient magnitudes to the ones reported. 
17 
 
factors in each country.16 Furthermore, by employing a system GMM estimator, which 
contains both levels and differences equations we deal adequately with the fixed effect’s 
dynamic panel bias (Roodman, 2009).17  
There could be a potential problem with the system GMM related to instrument 
proliferation, which may bias the coefficient estimates of endogenous variables, due to 
overfitting and weakening test procedures of instrument validity, as well as produce 
downward-biased standard errors. Therefore, we estimate our models with and without 
applying the Roodman’s (2009) collapsed instrument matrix procedure, reducing the 
instrument count.18 The two sets of estimated results turned out to be very similar and we 
report the set of results without collapsing. The estimated coefficients of all theoretically 
motivated control variables are significant and have the expected signs. Considering the 
AR(2) and Hansen-J tests respectively, there is no evidence of second-order autocorrelation 
or weak instruments (or correlation of instruments with the unobservable error process).  
- Tables 5 and 6 here – 
The variable in the focus of the analysis – the CAP payments – has a statistically 
significant effect in both the static and dynamic models. While the magnitudes of the 
coefficients, representing elasticity, appear small, they are of economic significance. The 
elasticity of employment with respect to total CAP payments is 0.014 (Table 5, column (1)), 
which means that completely removing the CAP payments in the UK would result in 1.4 per 
cent drop in employment in non-farm SMEs from the current level, ceteris paribus (no 
alternative amount spent in the UK by new national agricultural policy).19 Given our 
framework and considering that according to ONS (2015) SMEs employed 15.6 million 
people in 2015, a drop of 1.4 per cent is equivalent to about 220,000 jobs lost. In Table 5, 
column (2) we decompose total CAP payments into Pillar 1 and Pillar 2, which show 
                                                          
16 Multiway clustering of observations allows for correlation of observations at panel identifier and constituent 
country which in turn results in robust standard errors estimation (Baum et al., 2003). The four constituent 
countries differ in their implementation and administration of the CAP payments as well as there are structural 
differences in terms of agricultural land rental arrangements and proportions. It is noteworthy that the rental 
patterns are quite homogeneous within a constituent country and stable over time; thus, the country controls do 
capture important information on the CAP payments utilisation.  
17 In the system GMM differences equation, for endogenous variables, lags 2 and earlier are valid instrument. 
For predetermined variables (not strictly exogenous), lag 1 is also valid. For the lagged dependent variable, 
which is predetermined, realizations of lags 2 and earlier are valid instruments. In the levels equation, for 
endogenous variables, lags 1 and earlier of the first differences of the same variables are valid instruments, 
while for predetermined variables the contemporaneous first differences of the same variables are also valid. 
18 The Roodman’s collapse procedure creates one instrument for each variable and lag distance, rather than one 
for each time period, variable, and lag distance. However, in large samples, such as ours, collapsing the 
instrument matrix reduces statistical efficiency. 
19 The ceteris paribus condition here also implies that the amount of CAP payments would be reallocated in a 
tax neutral way. 
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differential magnitude of the effects. The contribution of Pillar 1 to non-farm employment is 
1.0% or 150,000 jobs and Pillar 2 contributes 0.5% or around 70,000 non-farm jobs.20  
In Table 6 we present the results of the dynamic models where we can distinguish 
between short and long run effects. The total short run effect of CAP payments (column (1)) 
is 0.9% while the long run effect is about 1.4% (0.9/(1-0.350)), similar to the one estimate 
from the static model. In column (2) the effects of Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 are estimated 
separately; the short run effects are 0.6% and 0.3% respectively generally preserving the 
relative importance of the two pillars from the static model analysis. Importantly, the static 
and dynamic analyses seem to produce comparable and consistent results. 
Even though in the previous section we argued that the CAP payments are unlikely to 
cause endogeneity problems in our set up of analysis, as a robustness check, we estimate a 
specification where CAP payments are treated as endogenous and instrumented with a 
measure of the total agricultural land at local authority level following ideas in Blomquist and 
Nordin (2017). We present in column (3) of Tables 5 and 6 the estimation results where we 
use the predicted value of CAP payments. The results obtained are similar to the ones 
discussed previously. Furthermore, we perform a C (difference in Hansen J-statistic) test for 
exogeneity of CAP payments which is a χ2 distributed test of the associated set of validity of 
orthogonality conditions. We could not reject the C test null hypothesis that the CAP 
payments are a proper instrument and therefore in the rest of the analysis and discussion we 
treat CAP payments as exogenous.  
The finding that Pilar 1 has a stronger impact on employment than Pillar 2 is 
interesting and suggests that, although in theory decoupled from farm output, Pillar 1 
payments do in fact affect the supply and demand linkages between farms and firms. 
Furthermore, the Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 payments appear to have heterogeneous effects on non-
farm employment that deserves a further investigation.  
- Table 7 here – 
In Table 7, the static and dynamic specifications from column (2) in Tables 5 and 6 
respectively are estimated while augmented with interaction terms between the CAP 
payments (separate for Pillar 1 and Pillar 2) and the rural area indicator - in columns (1) and 
(3) - and the agricultural supply chain indicator - in columns (2) and (4) - to identify rural-
                                                          
20 These estimated (direct) effects are likely to be the lower bound of the total effects, considering that the 
aggregate market demand variable may be already capturing some of the CAP spillovers in a dynamic sense, 
i.e., some of the employment increase due to higher demand is in fact indirectly driven by the past CAP 
expenditure contribution to the shift in demand. 
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location and industry-linkage specific impacts on employment. The estimated coefficients of 
the interaction terms in both the static and dynamic models are statistically significant, 
alongside the significant main effects, and their magnitudes suggest that the (long-run) 
impact of CAP payments on employment is relatively concentrated in the rural SMEs and 
within the agricultural supply chain. Furthermore, the rural dummy coefficient loses 
significance, suggesting that only the CAP payments bring extra employment in rural areas 
relative to urban areas. Regarding the agricultural supply chain employment, the interaction 
term leads to reduction in the dummy coefficient which in the static model also loses 
significance suggesting that again CAP payments play a very important role for job creation 
in the industries up- and downstream of agriculture. It is interesting that the effect of Pillar 1 
remains larger than Pillar 2.  
Considering that rural SMEs employed over 2 million people in 2015 (ONS, 2015) 
completely removing the CAP payments ceteris paribus would lead to losing around 45,000 
rural jobs as the negative impact on the rural labour market would be quite significant. 
Interestingly, the contribution of Pillar 2 to rural employment is higher (1.2%) compared to 
the contribution of Pillar 1 (1.0%). Considering that the Pillar 2 payments are just under a 
half of the Pillar 1 payments, the difference is even more pronounced per Euro spent.  
The contribution to employment in the agricultural supply chain of Pillar 1 is about 
17% and of Pillar 2 about 14% (estimated elasticities in the static model are 0.17 and 0.14 
respectively). Clearly, per Euro spent, the contribution of Pillar 2 again is higher than Pillar 1. 
The fact that CAP payments show higher overall employment creation in the agricultural 
supply chain compared to the rest of the economy suggests farmers’ spending on production 
and consumption activities, along the supply chain, generates spillovers and is important for 
non-farm employment in spite of subsidy decoupling.  
 
6 Conclusions 
This paper aims at filling the gap in the literature concerned with the effects of CAP 
payments on employment in the non-farm economy. Whilst most previous studies have 
focused on the effect of the CAP on employment in agriculture and/or in rural areas only, this 
paper investigates explicitly the inter-sectoral spillovers without limiting itself to the 
boundaries of ‘rural’. The theoretically founded estimation framework developed in this 
study leads to a firm employment function which is estimated with the FAME dataset 
containing rich firm level information. The estimated sample comprises about 200,000 firm-
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year observations and covers all industries in the UK economy. Both static and dynamic 
models of the employment function were estimated with a sample of SMEs only as these 
represent the majority of employing private businesses in the UK, particularly in rural areas. 
A distinctive feature of the study is the micro-data approach and the wide coverage of all 
sectors in the economy which allows capturing the net equilibrium employment effects of the 
CAP payments. 
The CAP has been subject to many criticisms by economists due to its market-
distorting effects, even after the decoupling of direct payments from farm production, and 
due to the blanket income support to farmers, which attenuates their incentives to stay 
competitive and profitable without substantial public transfers. However, this study has found 
a net positive effect of the CAP payments on non-farm employment, with relatively stronger 
effect of Pillar 2 (RD) compared to Pillar 1 (SFP) per Euro spent, especially in rural areas and 
within the agricultural supply chain. The magnitude of the overall estimated effect is 1.4% 
which is relatively small but of economic significance as it is associated with the creation of 
about 220,000 jobs. The effect is indeed smaller than the estimate of 5.3% by Mattas et al. 
(2011) for the CAP impact on regional employment levels in one NUTS 2 region in Greece. 
In a recent study on Sweden Blomquist and Nordin (2017) estimate an effect of the CAP 
direct payments on the private (non-farm) economy of around 2.4%. Due to differences in 
methodology and data used this cross-country comparison is speculative but also informative 
– if we argue that the UK has one of the most flexible and efficient labour markets in Europe 
which was characterised by relatively low unemployment during the period of analysis our 
results are in line with other studies. The UK case could be considered as an example of the 
lower bound of the CAP employment effects in the non-farm economy.  
Nevertheless, under an extreme policy scenario in which the CAP payments are 
completely removed without compensating/countervailing measures (and neutral tax policy), 
the impact on the UK employment would amount to about 220,000 jobs lost. Furthermore, 
the impact in rural areas will be more than two times stronger, in percentage terms, which 
equates to about 45,000 jobs lost. In the industries comprising the agricultural supply chain 
the effect, in percentage terms, is also substantial, at about 32% total reduction in 
employment. The results suggest that the removal of CAP payments could potentially have 
rural development implications beyond employment lost, e. g., contributing to the higher 
rural unemployment and a possible outflow of population from rural areas. Furthermore, if 
the extra jobs at firm level supported by the CAP were removed, there could also be a 
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negative efficiency effect, due to reduction of the scale of operation below the minimum 
efficient scale for some SMEs; such firms may become unviable and exit in the long run.  
A caveat to these results and discussion is that they are based on a partial equilibrium 
ceteris paribus analysis. This suggests that the findings should be interpreted as relevant to 
the question on the impact of CAP subsidy on jobs in the UK within the EU membership 
context and the CAP administrative framework, rather than Brexit, which would clearly be 
associated, besides withdrawal from CAP, with important changes in the UK’s trade regime 
and the overall functioning of the economy. 
Furthermore, the results should not be interpreted as an attempt to justify the role of 
CAP subsidies as a job creation policy across the EU because there might be other non-
agricultural, labour market policies which could be more efficient in increasing or sustaining 
employment opportunities in non-farm enterprises. Nevertheless, this study sends the 
message that a broader approach is necessary in analysing the implications of the CAP, as its 
impact is felt well beyond agriculture. 
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Table 1: Indicators of UK farming by constituent country, 2013 
Indicators England Northern 
Ireland 
Scotland Wales 
Total agricultural area 
(million ha) 
9.5 1.0 6.2 1.7 
Number of farms (‘000) 101 24.5 52.7 42.3 
Average farm size (ha) 90 41 106 37 
Crops/grass/ rough grazing 
(% of total agric. area)  
40/44/10 5/78/17 10/24/66 5/68/27 
Less favoured area (%) 17 70 85 81 
Gross output per farm 
(£’000) 
189.3 78.4 59.6 26.1 
Gross output per ha (£) 2016 1925 507 879 
Net Farm Income (average 
all farm types, £’000) 
34 13 21 17 
Source: Allen et al. (2014).  
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Table 2: CAP payments by funding stream and constituent country, € million *  
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
UK Total 4337 4327 4433 4417 4299 
Pillar 1 3424 3309 3348 3326 3234 
of which DP 3325 3304 3290 3285 3195 
           CMO 99 5 58 41 39 
Pillar 2 ** 913 1018 1085 1091 1065 
of which 
EAFRD 
512 653 742 752 798 
England Total 2761 2696 2777 2792 2714 
Pillar 1 2199 2099 2146 2126 2048 
of which DP 2100 2094 2088 2085 2009 
           CMO 99 5 58 41 39 
Pillar 2 ** 562 597 631 666 666 
of which 
EAFRD 
348 448 470 532 563 
Wales Total 413 417 426 406 413 
Pillar 1 DP 316 312 309 309 301 
Pillar 2 ** 97 105 117 97 112 
of which 
EAFRD 
38 45 54 48 54 
Scotland Total 779 826 840 819 757 
Pillar 1 DP 589 583 584 583 566 
Pillar 2 ** 190 243 256 236 191 
of which 
EAFRD 
92 123 167 113 119 
Northern 
Ireland Total 
384 388 390 400 415 
Pillar 1 DP 320 315 309 308 319 
Pillar 2 ** 64 73 81 92 96 
of which 
EAFRD 
34 37 51 59 62 
Source: Agriculture in the United Kingdom (2014). 
Notes: DP – Direct Payments; CMO – Common Market Organisation; EAFRD – European 
Agricultural Fund for Rural Development. * Annual data is for the EU financial year 16th 
October – 15th October. ** The difference between the total Pillar 2 and the amount received 
from EAFRD indicates the national co-financing. 
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Table 3 Definition of variables and summary statistics 
Variable Definition Mean (S.D.) 
Employment Number of full-time equivalent firm workers, log 3.07 (1.50) 
Market demand Annual 2-digit SIC by TTWA aggregated 
demand in thousands GBP, log 
13.83 (3.41) 
Demand variance Firm revenue deviation from 2-digit SIC 
geometric mean 
0.99 (2.11) 
Cost per employee Annual firm wage bill per FTE worker in 
thousands GBP, log 
2.99 (1.24) 
Firm size Value of firm total assets in thousands GBP, log 7.18 (2.60) 
Firm age Firm age in years 17.98 (17.93) 
Total subsidy  Value of total CAP subsidies (Pillars 1 and 2) at 
4-digit postcode district in thousands GBP, log 
8.78 (1.79) 
CMO share Share of common market organisation (CMO) 
subsidy, Pillar 1 
0.04 (0.11) 
DP share Share of direct payments (DP) aka SFP, Pillar 1 0.67 (0.41) 
Pillar 1 share Share of Pillar 1 (CMO+DP) 0.71 (0.39) 
Pillar 2 share Share of rural development payments (RD) 0.29 (0.39) 
Manufacturing Dummy for aggregate manufacturing industries 0.12 (0.33) 
Construction Dummy for construction and utilities industries 0.09 (0.28) 
Services Dummy for aggregate service industries 0.79 (0.41) 
Rural area Dummy for rural areas according to the DEFRA 
(wider) definition of rurality 
0.17 (0.38) 
Ag. supply chain Dummy for 4-digit SIC industries comprising 
the agricultural supply chain 
0.02 (0.12) 
Notes: Total number of observations: 190,348 for 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014. 
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Table 4 Summary statistics for rural and urban samples of SMEs 
Variable Rural mean (S.D.) Urban mean (S.D.) 
Employment 3.09 (1.55) 3.06 (1.49) 
Employment growth 0.01 (0.20) 0.01 (0.23) 
Market demand 11.84 (3.40) 14.24 (3.26) 
Demand variance 0.81 (2.06) 1.03 (2.12) 
Cost per employee 2.82 (1.21) 3.03 (1.24) 
Firm size 7.12 (2.61) 7.19 (2.59) 
Firm age 18.65 (17.97) 17.85 (17.92) 
Total subsidy  9.08 (1.79) 8.71 (1.78) 
CMO share 0.02 (0.09) 0.04 (0.12) 
DP share 0.76 (0.34) 0.66 (0.42) 
Pillar 1 share 0.78 (0.33) 0.70 (0.40) 
RD share 0.22 (0.33) 0.30 (0.40) 
Manufacturing 0.16 (0.36) 0.12 (0.32) 
Construction 0.10 (0.30) 0.08 (0.28) 
Services 0.74 (0.44) 0.80 (0.40) 
Ag. supply chain 0.03 (0.17) 0.01 (0.11) 
Number of observations 32,788 157,560 
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Table 5 Regression results for the full SMEs sample, static specifications 
Dependent variable Log of employment, ln(empl) 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) 
Total subsidy  0.014 ** 
(0.002) 
- - 
Total subsidy 
(instrumented) 
- - 0.018 ** 
(0.004) 
Pillar 1 share 0.023 ** 
(0.006) 
- 0.024 ** 
(0.006) 
Pillar 1 subsidy - 0.010 ** 
(0.001) 
- 
Pillar 2 subsidy - 0.005 ** 
(0.001) 
- 
Market demand 0.105 ** 
(0.007) 
0.105 ** 
(0.007) 
0.105 ** 
(0.007) 
Demand variance -0.183 ** 
(0.032) 
-0.183 ** 
(0.033) 
-0.184 ** 
(0.033) 
Cost per employee -0.226 ** 
(0.085) 
-0.228 ** 
(0.088) 
-0.221 ** 
(0.090) 
Firm size 0.088 ** 
(0.014) 
0.087 ** 
(0.014) 
0.087 ** 
(0.015) 
Firm age 0.017 ** 
(0.002) 
0.017 ** 
(0.002) 
0.017 ** 
(0.002) 
Rural area 0.114 ** 
(0.014) 
0.111 ** 
(0.013) 
0.110 ** 
(0.014) 
Ag. supply chain 0.248 ** 
(0.067) 
0.248 ** 
(0.067) 
0.248 ** 
(0.067) 
2010 -0.111 ** 
(0.007) 
-0.110 ** 
(0.008) 
-0.110 ** 
(0.007) 
2012 -0.151 ** 
(0.010) 
-0.154 ** 
(0.009) 
-0.164 ** 
(0.009) 
2014 -0.171 ** 
(0.012) 
-0.170 ** 
(0.012) 
-0.169 ** 
(0.012) 
Number of 
observations 
190,348 190,348 190,348 
Number of 
instruments 
45 45 45 
AR(1), p-value 0.01 0.01 0.02 
AR(2), p-value 0.63 0.52 0.43 
Hansen J, p-value 0.36 0.30 0.28 
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; level of significance ** 1%, * 5%. 
A set of 1-digit SIC industry dummies with reference category food processing is included in 
all regressions. 
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Table 6 Regression results for the full SMEs sample, dynamic specifications 
Dependent variable Log of employment, ln(empl) 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) 
Lagged ln(empl) 0.350 ** 
(0.013) 
0.351 ** 
(0.013) 
0.350 ** 
(0.013) 
Total subsidy  0.009 ** 
(0.001) 
- - 
Total subsidy 
(instrumented) 
- - 0.012 ** 
(0.002) 
Pillar 1 share 0.020 ** 
(0.003) 
- 0.022 ** 
(0.003) 
Pillar 1 subsidy - 0.006 ** 
(0.000) 
- 
Pillar 2 subsidy - 0.003 ** 
(0.000) 
- 
Market demand 0.084 ** 
(0.006) 
0.085 ** 
(0.007) 
0.085 ** 
(0.006) 
Demand variance -0.277 ** 
(0.017) 
-0.281 ** 
(0.018) 
-0.289 ** 
(0.017) 
Cost per employee -0.180 ** 
(0.051) 
-0.180 ** 
(0.050) 
-0.179 ** 
(0.050) 
Firm size 0.216 ** 
(0.026) 
0.215 ** 
(0.027) 
0.217 ** 
(0.027) 
Firm age 0.019 ** 
(0.005) 
0.019 ** 
(0.005) 
0.018 ** 
(0.005) 
Rural area 0.051 ** 
(0.011) 
0.050 ** 
(0.012) 
0.048 ** 
(0.012) 
Ag. supply chain 0.031 
(0.017) 
0.029 
(0.017) 
0.028 
(0.016) 
2010 -0.069 ** 
(0.006) 
-0.068 ** 
(0.006) 
-0.068 ** 
(0.006) 
2012 -0.068 ** 
(0.012) 
-0.074 ** 
(0.011) 
-0.076 ** 
(0.012) 
2014 -0.076 ** 
(0.013) 
-0.074 ** 
(0.013) 
-0.074 ** 
(0.013) 
Number of 
observations 
174,731 174,731 174,731 
Number of 
instruments 
48 48 48 
AR(1), p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR(2), p-value 0.15 0.14 0.13 
Hansen J, p-value 0.45 0.46 0.45 
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; level of significance ** 1%, * 5%. 
A set of 1-digit SIC industry dummies with reference category food processing is included in 
all regressions. 
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Table 7 Regression results for the full SMEs sample, cross effects 
Dependent variable Log of employment, ln(empl)   
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lagged ln(empl) - - 0.348 ** 
(0.014) 
0.344 ** 
(0.014) 
Pillar 1 subsidy 0.007 ** 
(0.002) 
0.006 ** 
(0.002) 
0.005 ** 
(0.001) 
0.004 ** 
(0.001) 
Pillar 2 subsidy 0.003 ** 
(0.001) 
0.003 ** 
(0.001) 
0.002 ** 
(0.001) 
0.002 ** 
(0.001) 
Pillar 1 subsidy 
*Rural area 
0.010 ** 
(0.002) 
- 0.007 ** 
(0.002) 
- 
Pillar 2 subsidy 
*Rural area 
0.012 ** 
(0.003) 
- 0.008 ** 
(0.002) 
- 
Pillar 1 subsidy * 
Ag. supply chain 
- 0.167 ** 
(0.009) 
- 0.109 ** 
(0.007) 
Pillar 2 subsidy * 
Ag. supply chain 
- 0.145 ** 
(0.010) 
- 0.096 ** 
(0.009) 
Market demand 0.113 ** 
(0.012) 
0.106 ** 
(0.008) 
0.092 ** 
(0.008) 
0.086 ** 
(0.006) 
Demand variance -0.206 ** 
(0.037) 
-0.177 ** 
(0.031) 
-0.318 ** 
(0.020) 
-0.268 ** 
(0.018) 
Cost per employee -0.165 ** 
(0.054) 
-0.181 ** 
(0.053) 
-0.194 ** 
(0.051) 
-0.197 ** 
(0.052) 
Firm size 0.070 ** 
(0.022) 
0.065 ** 
(0.015) 
0.230 ** 
(0.034) 
0.214 ** 
(0.030) 
Firm age 0.014 ** 
(0.003) 
0.018 ** 
(0.002) 
0.011 ** 
(0.002) 
0.013 ** 
(0.001) 
Rural area 0.112 
(0.083) 
0.112 ** 
(0.014) 
0.129  
(0.109) 
0.073 ** 
(0.014) 
Ag. supply chain 0.213 ** 
(0.070) 
0.169 
(0.130) 
0.247 ** 
(0.031) 
0.069 * 
(0.033) 
2010 -0.102 ** 
(0.007) 
-0.109 ** 
(0.009) 
-0.066 ** 
(0.006) 
-0.070 ** 
(0.006) 
2012 -0.118 ** 
(0.006) 
-0.120 ** 
(0.008) 
-0.076 ** 
(0.010) 
-0.077 ** 
(0.011) 
2014 -0.110 ** 
(0.010) 
-0.116 ** 
(0.012) 
-0.074 ** 
(0.014) 
-0.074 ** 
(0.014) 
Number of 
observations 
190,348 190,348 174,731 174,731 
Number of 
instruments 
45 45 48 48 
AR(1), p-value 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR(2), p-value 0.43 0.64 0.20 0.36 
Hansen J, p-value 0.37 0.42 0.46 0.49 
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; level of significance ** 1%, * 5%. 
A set of 1-digit SIC industry dummies with reference category food processing is included in 
all regressions. 
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Figure 1 Geographic distribution of firms in the UK 
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Figure 2 Geographic distribution of annual CAP payments 
   
